

Legislative Request	Voters' Position in Favor of Change	Current Law and Notes	Possible Funding Requirement	Proposed Law
<p>1. Require Public Access to Election Records</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ 92% of people polled want publicly transparent verifiably accurate elections. ➤ Public access to copies of election records and returns are necessary for publicly verifiable election integrity, and to detect voter disenfranchisement. ➤ Election officials are violating current Utah statute in order to do their jobs, but enforcing it selectively for the public. ➤ States with less secrecy surrounding their election records are able to detect and correct problems. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Requires “election returns” to be secured during poll closing and “destroyed without opening” after 22 months. ➤ Allows any and all election records to be classified as “election returns” and be kept secret from the public. ➤ Utah does not publicly post any polling place totals, so votes can be lost in transfer or be tallied incorrectly at the county offices. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ \$9,000 per county to provide a high-quality copier which can copy any shape records, digitize the records and, if desired, upload the copies to the Internet. ➤ Two days times an average of two staffers/poll workers per county following every election are needed to copy and make publicly available election records. 	<p>http://utahcountvotes.org/legisla-ture/PublicAccess2ElectionRecords4Utah.pdf</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Copies of all electronic and paper records having to do with elections that are necessary to verify the accuracy and currency of voter registration records, election returns, and election audits shall be made publicly available within one week of Election Day. ➤ Unused, used, and spoiled ballots shall be made publicly available to libraries who want to preserve them for future research after the 22 to 24 month federal preservation or election contest period is over. ➤ Encourage the use of publicly disclosed voting system programming.

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2. Ensure that Ballot Secrecy is Preserved	<p>Virtually no ballot secrecy exists currently in Utah because:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Time-stamped and sequentially-stored DRE paper and electronic records may be (and have been) matched to poll books to determine accurately how voters voted, or poll workers can watch the order of voters in poll booths, and voters in wheelchairs have no privacy when voting on TSx touch-screens. ➤ No privacy envelopes and no procedures which protect mail-in ballot, provisional ballot or optical scan ballot privacy are required or used in many of Utah's counties. 	<p>Utah's constitution requires ballot secrecy, but Utah's current voting system and election procedures violate Utah's constitutional ballot secrecy requirements.</p>	<p>Unfinished. Comparison cost studies of initial and ongoing voting system costs in other states show that the initial cost to purchase paper ballot voting systems which preserve ballot secrecy is repaid within four years by ongoing cost reductions. Utah taxpayers would be saved large sums of money after the initial four years. Initial costs vary depending on the selected voting system which preserves ballot secrecy.</p>	<p>http://utahcountvotes.org/legislature/BallotSecrecy4Utah.pdf</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Require individual durable paper ballot records that are not stored sequentially in the same order as voters vote, and are not time-stamped.¹ ➤ Require privacy envelopes and procedures which protect ballot privacy for all mail-in, provisional, and optical scan paper ballots.

¹ Durable ballots are more easily audited. Ballots can be stamped with randomly generated unique identifying numbers when voters cast them in order to make voting systems auditable on the ballot level. Ballot level auditable systems require auditing fewer ballots overall to achieve the same 99% confidence level in election outcomes and hence are more cost-effective to audit.

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<p>3. Require Routine Independent Audits of State and Federal Machine-Counted Election Outcomes</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Utah's current audit procedures do not check that unofficial vote counts reflect voters' choices. ➤ The election industry should not be exempt from the independent scrutiny that business and churches are subjected to. ➤ Financial motives exist to manipulate elections. ➤ Human beings who program ballots and machines make errors. ➤ Pre-election testing of voting machines is inadequate to ensure that Election Day counts are accurate. ➤ Ballot secrecy requirements makes election results harder to secure and easier to manipulate than bank funds. ➤ Without manual audits, electronic ballots and tallying make it trivially easy and quick for a single person to undetectably manipulate state-wide or county-wide election outcomes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ No existing statute requires any routine checks of machine counts. ➤ Utah Lt. Governor's current voter instructions and election audit procedure do not check to see if votes are accurately cast, or accurately transferred to or tallied on the county central tabulator. <p>Note: A Green Party/Utah Count Votes critique of Utah Lt. Governor's current election audits procedures is here: http://utahcountvotes.org/ltagov/Response2LtGov-Audit-Recount.pdf</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ 2% of precincts would on average need to be manually audited to achieve 95% to 99% certainty of election outcome integrity. ➤ Estimated cost would be about \$250,000 per election. (New Mexico spends \$200,000 per election to manually audit 2% of ballots.) ➤ Possible outlay to provide a security camera for each county to make the manual audits and canvass process publicly viewable and/or to monitor paper ballot security between Election Day and the audit. 	<p>http://utahcountvotes.org/legislature/ElectionAudits4Utah.pdf</p> <p>Overview of Requirements</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Release a public report of unofficial machine counts. 2. Calculate the audit sample sizes based on the race margins for 99% confidence-level. 3. Publicly select the random sample of auditable vote counts. 4. Conduct publicly observable manual counts of selected voter-verified paper ballots. 5. Compare the manual with the machine counts. 6. Investigate the discrepancies, make any corrections, and decide whether to certify the results or to expand the manual audit. 7. Certify the election results or call for a re-election for any races left in doubt. (Re-elections would only be necessary if sufficient numbers of voter-verified paper ballots are missing or damaged.) 8. Publicly release the official election results and the results of the audits.

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<p>4. Reliable and Convenient Access for Voters. Avoid election disruption and prevent voter disenfranchisement in cases of electronic failures or errors in voting systems or in electronic voter registration rolls.</p>	<p>Without paper ballots available, elections are susceptible to Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, power outages, touch-screen calibration & delay errors, ballot definition errors, long lines, hacking, and other electronic failures and errors causing voter disenfranchisement and errors in recording and counting votes. However, having paper ballots available is useless if voters are prevented from signing in to vote by electronic poll book failures or power outages.</p>	<p>➤</p>	<p>➤ unfinished</p>	<p>http://utahcountvotes.org/legislature/VoterAccess4Utah.pdf</p> <p>Require pre-printed paper ballots, paper poll book & paper voter sign-in systems at all polling locations.</p> <p>Require official paper registers and paper poll books to be available in case of electronic failure of electronic poll books and require electronic poll books to use open source software. Prohibit anything that allows sole control over both pollbook and voting systems or has potential for one notifying the other directly via network (creates a giant opportunity for digital ballot stuffing.)</p> <p>Allow for Election Day voter registration using provisional balloting.</p>